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Abstract 
This paper attempts to rekindle interest on regional allocation of investment and to 
show that a trade-off between aggregate efficiency and interregional equity is implied. 
Modifying, however, the objective function it is established that this trade-off can be 
avoided.    
 
JEL Classification: R10 
 
1. Introduction 
A major concern for policy-makers is how to allocate resources across space (regional 
investment) in order to achieve aggregate efficiency (maximum output) without 
increasing regional inequalities (interregional equity). The purpose of this paper is to 
contribute in that direction using Optimal Control Theory (hereafter OCT) and 
amending the framework developed by Intriligator (1964). The rest of the paper is laid 
out as follows. Section 2 summarises what we can learn from the model of regional 
allocation of investment. Section 3 then outlines an alternative framework, modifying 
the objective function by attaching a „weight‟ in each region. Section 4 summarises 
the arguments and considers the lessons for policy making. 
 
2. Regional Allocation of Investment  
A starting point is provided by Intriligator (1964), who building upon the work of 
Rahman (1963), showed that OCT can be applied in order to maximise national 
output ( NY ) in a „two-region‟ economy at some terminal time (T ). Given a 
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production function iii KvY , 2,1i , fixed capital coefficient and assuming that a 
constant proportion of output is saved ( iii YsS ), capital accumulation evolves as 
221121 KKKK
 1. Intriligator (1964) assumes that once capital is placed in one 
region, it cannot be shifted into the other region. Total savings are pooled in a central 
agency and allocated to each region, given an „allocation parameter‟ ( ). The 
objective function is, therefore, )(TYMax N , subject to the constraints, given by 
equations (1), (2) and (2) below.    
)( 22111 KKK
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))(1( 22112 KKK
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Assuming constant returns, at any point in time either 0)(* t  or 1)(* t , The 
problem can be solved by identifying the value of )(t  that maximises the 
Hamiltonian function, )]()([ 2211221 KKpppH , where 1p and 2p are the 
auxiliary variables, frequently referred to as the implicit price of capital. The optimal 
path of  depends on the sign of the difference )()( 21 tptp . Put simply, the optimal 
solution suggests that the funds should be invested in the region where the shadow 
price of capital is higher. Thus, if 0)()( 21 tptp , then 1
*  while if  
0)()( 21 tptp , then 0
* . The Hamiltonian system must satisfy the conditions 
},{max 211
1
1 pp
K
H
p  and },{max 122
2
2 pp
K
H
p , implying that 
12211 ])([ pppp  and 22212 ])([ pppp . Therefore,   
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For a given planning period, ]0[ T , 1)(* t  at Tt0  if 21 or 0)(
* t  if 
21
. Conversely, at Tt  invest only in the region with the highest output/capital 
ratio; that is to say if 
21 vv , then 1)(
* t  while if 21 vv , then 0)(
* t . 
Following Takayama (1967), setting 0  yields 222 pp , which is a first order 
differential equation with the solution )(
22
2)(
tT
evtp . Solving for t , the switching 
time can be estimated:   
1
21
21
2
* log
1
v
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Tt          (6)                                       
In the model so far, the possibility of uneven distribution of regional incomes is not 
considered, at least explicitly. Nevertheless, a number of interesting implications can 
be derived. In order to have a concrete vocabulary, define the initial income gap 
between region 1 and 2 as )0()0()0( 21 YYG . Assuming that 0)0(G , 21  
and 
21 vv , then the optimal solution 1)(
* t , ]0[∈∀ Tt   yields maximum 
output but at the expanse of closing the income „gap‟ between region 1 and 2, i.e. a 
trade-off between aggregate efficiency and regional equity. When 
21
 and 
21 vv  
a switch in the allocation parameter is necessary if total output is to be maximised. 
This will also reduce regional inequalities at Tt
2
. A steady elimination of the 
income gap between the two regions while a constant increase in total output is 
feasible if 
21
 and 
21 vv . Given that 21 vv  and 21 , the solution 
0)(* t , ]0[∈∀ Tt  , enables the planner to overcome the trade-off between 
efficiency and equity
3
.           
Nevertheless, it is possible to extend the argument by attaching a „weight‟ in each 
region. While Takayama (1967) acknowledges that this possibility, nevertheless, to 
the best of our knowledge, this remained a rather unexplored area and is examined in 
the next section.  
 
 
 
                                               
2 If 
21
 and 
21
vv , then 0)(
* t at Tt0 and 1)(
* t at Tt . Regional disparities can be 
reduced at Tt0  and increase again at the end of the period.  
 
3 Similarly, the trade-off is absent when 1)(
* t , ]0[ Tt   if 0)0(G .  
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3. Regional Allocation of Investment: An Alternative Perspective 
According to Intriligator (1964), the investment decision is determined exclusively by 
different growth potentials in each region. It is possible, however, to attach a different 
„weight‟ to each region4, reflecting political or social reasons. National output, 
therefore, can be expressed as: )()( TYTY iiN , where 0i  is the weight attached 
to each region
5
. Maintaining OCT as the basic vehicle of analysis, the problem is 
defined as  
)()()( 222111 TKvTKvTYMax N , with 021       (7) 
subject to the constraints defined by equations (1), (2) and (3).  
It follows that 
2
21
221 )()()( tptptp while the terminal conditions 
111 )( vTp  and 222 )( vTp , imply that   
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Before the end of the planning period ( Tt0 ) the optimal solution is 1)(
* t  if 
21
or 0)(* t  if 21 . At the end of the planning period (T ) if 2211 vv , 
then 1)(* t  while if 2211 vv , then 0)(
* t . The switching time is given by 
the following expression:  
221
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Essentially, the objective function in equation (7) encapsulates two components, 
aggregate efficiency and interregional equity. When 0)0(G  and 
21
, the 
efficiency component dominates. By analogy, if 0)0(G  and 
21
, then the 
equity element is of primary concern
6
. Nevertheless, the aim 0)(TG  might not be 
feasible. Hence, it would be more reasonable to define an aim 0)(TG . The 
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5 From a technical standpoint attaching weights (
n
i
i
1
1 ) does not alter the structure of the 
production functions. 
 
6 It is possible to consider several planning periods, e.g. a period with an exclusive domination of 
efficiency and regional equity appearing in the subsequent period.     
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investment sequence when 
21
 and 
21
are set out in Table 1 and 2, 
respectively.   
 
Table 1: Regional Allocation of Investment when 
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Table 2: Regional Allocation of Investment when 
21
 
       
21
 
21
 
 
21
vv  
21
vv  
21
vv  
21
vv  
21
 0
21
 0
21
 0
21
 0
21
 
)()(
21
TpTp  0
2211
vv  0
2211
vv  0
2211
vv  0
2211
vv  
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Table 1 implies that if 0)0(G  and 
21
, then the optimal policy sustains the 
initial gap in regional incomes, provided that 
21
. A change in the allocation 
parameter triggers a reduction in regional inequalities if 
21
. Assume, however, 
that 0)0(G  and that the planner has an explicit interest in reducing the income gap 
between the two regions. This assumption can be expressed as 
21
7
. According 
to the conditions set out in Table 2, 1)(* t  at Tt0  if 21 . Given that 
21
, then 0=)(* tδ  at Tt = , irrespective of the difference in the capital 
coefficients. In this case, although initial regional disparities increase during the 
period Tt0 , a reduction in the income gap between the two regions is possible 
due to a switch in  at Tt = . While Intriligator (1964) implies a trade-off when 
21
 and 
21 vv , this can be avoided by imposing 21 . Contrary to the 
possibility of perpetuating regional inequalities, implied by Intriligator (1964) when 
1)(* t , ]0[ Tt  . It is conceivable that regional equity dominates when 21   
and 21 . The allocation parameter remains unchanged and a steady elimination 
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of the income gap is observed. The optimal solution implied by the conditions 
21
 
and 
21
 is 0)(* t , ]0[ Tt  . Thus, irrespective of the productivity 
differences between regions, a simultaneous reduction of regional inequalities and 
maximisation of aggregate output is possible. In terms of the analysis by Intriligator 
(1964) this is feasible only if 
21 vv  and 21 .  
 
Table 3 and 4 compare the switching times implied by equation (6) and (9) when 
21
 and 
21
, respectively.     
Table 3: Switching times when 
21
 
 tt *  21 vv , 21 ss , 21  
tt *  21 vv , 21 ss , 21  
tt *  21 vv , 21 ss , 21  
 
Table 4: Switching times when
21
 
tt *  21 vv , 21 ss , 21  
tt *  21 vv , 21 ss , 21  
tt *  21 vv , 21 ss , 21  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
An aggregate efficiency and regional equity component is normally involved in the 
design of regional policies. Nevertheless, these might contradict each other, given that 
maximising aggregate efficiency may increase regional income differentials; a topic 
that appears to be attracting increasing attention and interest amongst policy-making 
bodies. This paper has shown that this contradiction can be avoided by a simple 
modification of the model, developed by Intriligator (1964). Introducing, a weight to 
the income of each region, provides a range of policies which result to a simultaneous 
reduction of regional inequalities and maximisation of total output, allowing for a 
more efficient allocation of scarce resources. Nevertheless, this depends on the time 
horizon and the chosen spatial units. The variation discussed in this paper is versatile 
and flexible enough to be applied in various contexts and provides a range of choices 
to policy-makers in designing regional (or even sectoral) policies. Yet, economic 
knowledge cannot be gleaned from theory alone. For theoretical innovation to 
convince they need to be evaluated through observed facts. This clearly implies the 
need for more detailed and focused analysis and research before the trade-off can be 
discussed with confidence. What then is the purpose of such analysis? Perhaps the 
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main purpose should be to provoke interest and further discussion in the possibility of 
„bridging‟ the gap between aggregate efficiency and interregional equity.  
 
References 
 
Intriligator, M. (1964) “Regional Allocation of Investment: Comment”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 78(4), 659-662. 
Rahman, A. (1963) “Regional Allocation of Investment: An Aggregate Study in the 
Theory of Development Programming”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 77 (1), 26-
39. 
Takayama, A. (1967) “Regional Allocation of Investment: A Further Analysis”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81(1), 330-333. 
 
 
